Abstract-t-Closeness is a privacy model recently defined for data anonymization. A data set is said to satisfy t-closeness if, for each group of records sharing a combination of key attributes, the distance between the distribution of a confidential attribute in the group and the distribution of the attribute in the entire data set is no more than a threshold t. Here, we define a privacy measure in terms of information theory, similar to t-closeness. Then, we use the tools of that theory to show that our privacy measure can be achieved by the postrandomization method (PRAM) for masking in the discrete case, and by a form of noise addition in the general case.
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INTRODUCTION
A microdata set is a data set whose records carry information on individual respondents, like people or enterprises. The attributes in a microdata set can be classified as follows:
. Identifiers. These are attributes that unambiguously identify the respondent. Examples are passport number, social security number, full name, etc. Since our objective is to prevent confidential information from being linked to specific respondents, we shall assume in what follows that, in a preprocessing step, identifiers have been removed or encrypted. . Key attributes. Borrowing the definition from [2] , [3] , key attributes are those that, in combination, can be linked with external information to reidentify (some of) the respondents to whom (some of) the records in the microdata set refer. Examples are job, address, age, gender, etc. Unlike identifiers, key attributes cannot be removed, because any attribute is potentially a key attribute. . Confidential outcome attributes. These are attributes which contain sensitive information on the respondent. Examples are salary, religion, political affiliation, health condition, etc. The classification of attributes as key or confidential need not be disjoint or objectively unique. Ultimately, it relies on the specific application the microdata set is intended for.
There are several privacy models to anonymize microdata sets. k-Anonymity [3] , [4] is probably the best known. However, it presents several shortcomings which have motivated the appearance of enhanced privacy models reviewed below. t-Closeness [5] is one of those recent proposals. Despite its conceptual appeal, t-closeness lacks computational procedures which allow reaching it with minimum data utility loss.
Contribution and Plan of this Paper
Here, we define a privacy measure similar to the idea of t-closeness and provide an information-theoretic formulation of the privacy-distortion trade-off problem in microdata anonymization. This is done in such a way that the knowledge body of information theory can be used to find a solution to it. The resulting solution turns out to be the postrandomization (PRAM) masking method [6] , [7] , [8] in the discrete case and a form of noise addition in the general case.
Section 2 reviews the state of the art in k-anonymity-based privacy models. Mathematical conventions and a brief review of information-theoretic concepts are provided in Section 3. Section 4 gives an information-theoretic formulation of the privacy-distortion trade-off problem, similar to t-closeness. Section 5 contains a theoretical analysis of the solution to this problem. Empirical results are reported in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
k-Anonymity requires that each combination of key attribute values be shared by at least k records in the data set. To enforce k-anonymity, there are at least two computational procedures: the original approach based on generalization and recoding of the key attributes [3] , [4] and a microaggregation-based approach described in [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , and illustrated in Fig. 1 . While k-anonymity prevents identity disclosure (reidentification is infeasible within a group sharing the same key attribute values), it may fail to protect against (approximate) attribute disclosure: such is the case if the k records sharing a combination of key attribute values also share the value of a confidential attribute. Several enhancements of k-anonymity have been proposed to address the above and other shortcomings. Some of them are mentioned in what follows.
In [13] , [14] , an evolution of k-anonymity called p-sensitive k-anonymity was presented. Its purpose is to protect against attribute disclosure by requiring that there be at least p different values for each confidential attribute within the records sharing a combination of key attributes. p-Sensitive k-anonymity has the limitation of implicitly assuming that each confidential attribute takes values uniformly over its domain, that is, that the frequencies of the various values of a confidential attribute are similar. When this is not the case, achieving p-sensitive k-anonymity may cause a huge data utility loss.
Like p-sensitive k-anonymity, l-diversity [15] was defined with the aim of solving the attribute disclosure problem that can arise with k-anonymity. A data set is said to satisfy l-diversity if, for each group of records sharing a combination of key attributes, there are at least l "well-represented" values for each confidential attribute. Depending on the definition of "well-represented," l-diversity can reduce to p-sensitive k-anonymity or be a bit more complex. However, it shares with the latter the problem of huge data utility loss. Also, it is insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure, because at least the following two attacks are conceivable:
. Skewness attack. If, within a group of records sharing a combination of key attributes, the distribution of the confidential attribute is very different from its distribution in the overall data set, then an intruder linking a specific respondent to that group may learn confidential information (e.g., imagine that the proportion of respondents with AIDS within the group is much higher than in the overall data set). . Similarity attack. If values of a confidential attribute within a group are l-diverse but semantically similar (e.g., similar diseases or similar salaries), attribute disclosure also takes place. t-Closeness [5] tries to overcome the above attacks. A microdata set is said to satisfy t-closeness if, for each combination of key attributes, the distance between the distribution of the confidential attributes in the group and the distribution of the attributes in the whole data set is no more than a threshold t. t-Closeness can be argued to protect against skewness and similarity (see [16] for a more detailed analysis):
. To the extent to which the within-group distribution of confidential attributes resembles the distribution of those attributes for the entire data set, skewness attacks will be thwarted. . Again, since the within-group distribution of confidential attributes mimics the distribution of those attributes over the entire data set, no semantic similarity can occur within a group that does not occur in the entire data set. (Of course, within-group similarity cannot be avoided if all patients in a data set have similar diseases.) The main limitation of the original t-closeness paper is that no computational procedure to reach t-closeness was specified. This is what we address in the remainder of this paper by leaning on the framework of information theory. Throughout Section 4, we provide specific details on additional connections between our work and the literature, from a more technical, information-theoretic perspective.
MATHEMATICAL CONVENTIONS AND INFORMATION-THEORETIC PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, the measurable space in which a random variable (r.v.) takes on values will be called an alphabet. We shall follow the convention of using uppercase letters for r.v.s, and lowercase letters for particular values they take on. Probability density functions (PDFs) and probability mass functions (PMFs) are denoted by p, subindexed by the corresponding r.v. in the case of ambiguity risk. For example, both p X ðxÞ and pðxÞ denote the value of the function p X at x, which aids in writing more concise equations. Informally, we occasionally refer to the function p as pðxÞ. Similarly, we use the notations p XjY and pðxjyÞ equivalently. We adopt the same notation for information-theoretic quantities used in [17] . Specifically, the symbol H will denote entropy, h differential entropy, I mutual information, and D relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We briefly recall those concepts for the reader not intimately familiar with information theory:
. The entropy HðXÞ of a discrete r.v. X with PMF p is a measure of its uncertainty, and it is defined as HðXÞ ¼ ÀE log pðXÞ ¼ À X x pðxÞ log pðxÞ:
If X is a continuous r.v. instead, say distributed in IR k and with PDF p, the analogous measure is the differential entropy hðXÞ ¼ ÀE log pðXÞ ¼ À Z IR k pðxÞ log pðxÞ dx:
. The conditional entropy of a r.v. X given a r.v. Y is the entropy of X conditioned on each value y of Y , averaged over all values y. In the discrete case,
pðxjyÞ log pðxjyÞ
¼ À X
x;y pðx; yÞ log pðxjyÞ;
where pðxjyÞ is the probability of X ¼ x given that Y ¼ y. The conditional differential entropy of two continuous r.v.s is defined in an entirely analogous manner, with expectations taking the form of integrals in lieu of summations. . Let pðxÞ and qðxÞ be two probability distributions over the same alphabet. The KL divergence DðpkqÞ is a measure of their discrepancy. In the case when p and q are PMFs, it is defined as
DðpkqÞ ¼ E p log pðXÞ qðXÞ ¼ X x pðxÞ log pðxÞ qðxÞ :
When p and q are PDFs, the expectation is written as an integral. The KL divergence might be thought of as a "distance" between distributions, in the sense that DðpkqÞ ! 0, with equality if, and only if, p ¼ q (almost surely). . The conditional KL divergence DðpðxjyÞkqðxjyÞÞ is the average, over the conditioning distribution pðyÞ, of the KL divergence between the conditional distributions pðxjyÞ and qðxjyÞ (regarded as unconditional distributions for each y). Precisely, in the discrete case,
pðx; yÞ log pðxjyÞ qðxjyÞ ;
where the joint distribution is taken to be pðx; yÞ ¼ pðxjyÞ pðyÞ. . The mutual information IðX; Y Þ of two r.v.s X, Y is a measure of the amount of information that one random variable contains about the other, satisfying IðX; Y Þ ! 0, with equality if, and only if, X and Y are statistically independent. It is defined as the KL divergence between the joint distribution pðx; yÞ and the independent distribution pðxÞ pðyÞ generated by the marginal ones:
IðX; Y Þ ¼ Dðpðx; yÞkpðxÞ pðyÞÞ ¼ E log pðX; Y Þ pðXÞ pðY Þ :
In the discrete case,
pðx; yÞ log pðx; yÞ pðxÞ pðyÞ ¼ HðXÞ À HðXjY Þ ¼ HðY Þ À HðY jXÞ; that is, the mutual information is the uncertainty reduction on X if Y is observed, and vice versa. An entirely analogous expression is satisfied in the continuous case, with differential entropies and integrals in lieu of entropies and summations. A (deterministic) quantizer is a function that partitions a continuous range of values x, approximating each resulting cell by a valuex of a discrete r.v. Often, the quantizer map xðxÞ is broken down into two steps. Namely, an assignment to quantization indices, usually natural numbers, by means of a function qðxÞ, and a reconstruction functionxðqÞ mapping indices into values that approximate the original data, so thatxðxÞ ¼xðqðxÞÞ. A randomized version generalizes the functionxðxÞ by a conditional PMF pðxjxÞ, or pðqjxÞ in terms of indices.
Occasionally, the expectation of a r.v. is written as the letter subindexed by its name. Variances and covariances are written as the squared lowercase letter 2 and the uppercase letter AE, respectively, subindexed by the name of the r.v.s involved. The notation X $ N ð; AEÞ will be used to indicate that X is a Gaussian r.v. with mean and positive definite covariance AE.
The set of real m Â n matrices is denoted by IR mÂn . diagðd 1 ; . . . ; d n Þ denotes a diagonal matrix with entries d 1 ; . . . ; d n . Curly inequality symbols are used to represent matrix definiteness. For example, A # 0 indicates that A is nonnegative definite.
INFORMATION-THEORETIC FORMULATION OF THE PRIVACY-DISTORTION TRADE-OFF
Let W and X be jointly distributed r.v.s in arbitrary alphabets, possibly discrete or continuous. In the problem of database tcloseness described above and depicted in Fig. 1 , X represents (the tuple of) key attributes to be perturbed, which could otherwise be used to identify an individual. In the same application, confidential attributes containing sensitive information are denoted by W . Assume that the joint distribution of X and W is known, for instance, an empirical distribution directly drawn from a table, or a parametric statistical model inferred from a subset of records.
Distortion Criterion
A distortion measure dðx;xÞ is any measurable, nonnegative, real-valued function representing the distortion between the original data X and a perturbed versionX, the latter also a r.v., commonly but not necessarily in the same alphabet of X. The associated expected distortion D ¼ E dðX;XÞ provides a measure of utility of the perturbed data, in the intuitive sense that low distortion approximately preserves the values of the original data, and their joint statistical properties with respect to any other data of interest, in particular W . For example, if dðx;xÞ ¼ kx Àxk 2 , then D is the mean-square error (MSE). Intuitively, a more general form dðw; x;xÞ of distortion measure might interestingly widen the range of applications of our framework, possibly at the cost of mathematical tractability.
Privacy Criterion
Consider now, on the one hand, the distribution p W of the confidential information W , and on the other, the conditional distribution p W jX given the observation of the perturbed attributesX. In the database k-anonymization problem, whenever the posterior distribution p W jX differs from the prior distribution p W , we have actually gained some information about individuals statistically linked to the perturbed key attributesX, in contrast to the statistics of the general population. Concordantly, define the privacy risk R as the conditional KL divergence D between the posterior and the prior distributions, that is,
Section 3 recalls the concept of conditional KL divergence, also explained, for instance, in [17] . 
Connections with Other Privacy Criteria
We would like to stress that the use of an informationtheoretic quantity for privacy assessment is by no means new. First and foremost, we would like to acknowledge that our privacy measure is tightly related to the measure of t-closeness in [5] . Direct application of the concept of t-closeness to our formulation would lead to define that a distribution satisfies the criterion of t-closeness provided that Dðp W jX ðÁjxÞkp W Þ t for all valuesx ofX. This would naturally suggest measuring privacy risk as the essential supremum (maximum in the discrete case) of Dðp W jX ðÁjXÞkp W Þ, in lieu of the average of (1). Although in our paper, we choose to give credit to the idea of t-closeness with regard to the privacy criterion followed in our formulation, the above discussion clarifies that, technically, below the conceptual level, the t-closeness criterion is not quite the same. Basically, our privacy criterion is an average measure over a divergence. Recall that, by definition, a divergence itself is also an average measure. In the finite-alphabet case, t-closeness is a maximum over divergences, themselves averages. It might still be questionable whether the original t-closeness also succeeds in capturing the disclosure risk for a particular record. A related, more conservative criterion named -disclosure privacy is proposed in [18] , which measures the maximum difference between the prior and the posterior distributions for each group sharing a common x. More precisely, in terms of our formulation and still in the finite case, a distribution satisfies this criterion provided that max w j log p W jX ðwjxÞ pW ðwÞ j < for all valuesx ofX. Simply put, -disclosure is a maximum over a maximum.
It is fair to stress that average-case optimization may not address worst cases properly, although the price of worstcase optimization is, in general, a poorer average, ceteris paribus. In other words, we must acknowledge that our privacy criterion, in spite of its mathematical tractability, as any criterion based on averages, may not be adequate in all applications [19] . More generally, in spite of its conceptual, information-theoretic appeal, it is important to point out that the adequacy of our formulation relies on the appropriateness of the criteria optimized, which in turn depends on the specific application, on the statistics of the data, on the degree of data utility we are willing to compromise, and last but not least, on the adversarial model and the mechanisms against privacy contemplated. Neither our privacy criterion, nor other widely popular criteria such as k-anonymity in its numerous varieties, are the be-all and end-all of database anonymization [18] .
A much earlier connection with the literature can be traced back to the work by Shannon in 1949 [20] . Note that IðW ;XÞ and HðW jXÞ in (2) are equivalent minimization objectives in the design ofX, under the assumption that W , and therefore, HðW Þ are given. Shannon introduced the concept of equivocation as the conditional entropy of a private message given an observed cryptogram, later used in the formulation of the problem of the wiretap channel [21] as a measure of confidentiality. We can also trace back to the fifties the information-theoretic interpretation of the divergence between a prior and a posterior distribution, named (average) information gain in some statistical fields [22] , [23] .
In addition to the work already cited, [7] , [24] , [25] already used Shannon entropy as a measure of information loss, pointing out limitations affecting specific applications. We would like to stress out that we use a KL divergence as a measure of information disclosure (rather than loss), consistently with the equivalence between the case when p W jX ¼ p W and the complete absence of privacy risk. On the other hand, the flexibility in our definition of distortion measure as a measure of information loss may enable us to preserve the statistical properties of the perturbed data to an arbitrary degree, possibly with respect to any other data of interest. Of course, the choice of distortion measure should ultimately rely on each particular application.
Problem Statement
Consequently, we are interested in the trade-off between two contrasting quantities, privacy and distortion, by means of perturbation of the original data. More precisely, consider randomized perturbation rules on the original data X, determined by the conditional distribution pX jX of the perturbed dataX given X. In the special case when the alphabets involved are finite, pX jX may be regarded as a transition probability matrix, such as the one that appears in the PRAM masking method [6] , [7] , [8] . Considering randomized rules with only X as input, but not W , formally assumes the conditional independence ofX and W given X. Two remarks are in order. First, we consider randomized rules because deterministic quantizers (see Section 3) are a particular case, and at this point, we may not discard the possibility that more general rules attain a better trade-off.
Second, we consider rules that affect and depend on X only, but not W , for simplicity. Specifically, implementing and estimating convenient conditional distributions pX jWX rather than pX jX will usually be more complex, and require large quantities of data to prevent overfitting issues.
To sum up, we are interested in a randomized perturbation minimizing the privacy risk given a distortion constraint (or vice versa). In mathematical terms, we consistently define the privacy-distortion function as 
Proposition 3 in Section A.1 asserts that there is no loss of generality in assuming that Q andX are related bijectively, thus IðW ; QÞ ¼ IðW ;XÞ, and that both definitions indeed lead to the same function. The elements involved in the definition of the privacy-distortion function are depicted in Fig. 2 . Even though the motivating application for this work is the problem of database t-closeness, it is important to notice that our formulation in principle addresses any applications where perturbative methods for privacy are of interest. Another illustrative application is privacy for locationbased services (LBS) [26] . In this scenario, private information such as the user's location (or a sequence thereof) may be modeled by the r.v. X, to be perturbed, and W may represent a user ID. The posterior distribution pX jW now becomes the distribution of the user's perturbed location, and the prior distribution pX, the population's distribution.
Connections with Rate-Distortion Theory
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of the formulation of the privacy-distortion problem in Section 4.4 is the strong resemblance it bears with the rate-distortion problem in the field of information theory. We shall see that our formulation is a generalization of a well-known, extensively studied information-theoretic problem with half a century of maturity. Namely, the problem of lossy compression of source data with a distortion criterion, first proposed by Shannon in 1959 [27] .
To emphasize the connection, briefly recall that the simplest version of the problem of lossy data compression, shown in Fig. 3 , involves coding of identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies X 1 ; X 2 ; . . . of a generic r.v. X. To this end, an n-letter deterministic quantizer maps blocks of n copies X 1 ; . . . ; X n into quantization indices Q in the set f1; . . . ; b2 nR cg, where R represents the coding rate in bits needed to represent an index, per sample [17] . An estimationX 1 ; . . . ;X n of the source data vector is recovered to minimize the expected distortion per sample D ¼ 1 n P i E dðX i ;X i Þ, according to some distortion measure dðx;xÞ. Intuitively, a rate of zero bits may only be achieved in the uninteresting case when no information is conveyed, whereas in the absence of distortion, the rate is maximized. Rate-distortion theory [17] deals with the characterization of the optimal trade-off between the rate R and the distortion D, allowing codes with arbitrarily large block length n. Accordingly, the rate-distortion function is defined as the infimum of the rates of codes satisfying a distortion constraint.
A surprising and fundamental result of rate-distortion theory is that such function, defined in terms of blocks of samples, can be expressed in terms of a single copy or letter of the source data vector [17] , often more suitable for theoretical analysis. More precisely, the single-letter characterization of the rate-distortion function is 
represented in Fig. 4 . Aside from the fact that the equivalent problem is expressed in terms of a single letter X rather than n copies, there are two additional differences. First, the quantizer is randomized, and determined by a conditional distribution p QjX . Second, the rate is no longer the number of bits required to index quantization cells, or even the lowest achievable rate using an ideal entropy coder, namely the entropy of the quantization index HðQÞ. Instead, the rate is a mutual information R ¼ IðX;XÞ. Interestingly, the single-letter characterization of the rate-distortion function (5) is almost identical to our definition of privacy-distortion function (3), except for the fact that in the latter there is an extra variable W , the confidential attributes, in general, different from X, the key attributes. It turns out that some of the informationtheoretic results and methods for the rate-distortion problem can be extended, with varying degrees of effort, to the privacy-distortion problem formulated in this work. These extensions are discussed in the next section.
Clearly, the more general privacy-distortion function boils down to Shannon's rate-distortion in the special case when W ¼ X. The interpretation behind this case, in light of the formulation of Section 4.4, is that all available attributes are regarded as both key and confidential. In this case, the privacy-distortion function can be computed with the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm [17] .
We would like to remark that recent work [28] , [29] uses the concept of Shannon's equivocation [20] as a measure of anonymity, similarly to our privacy criterion (2) . In addition, it elegantly establishes a relationship between rate-distortion theory on the one hand, and, on the other, the trade-off between throughput and anonymity against traffic analysis in network packet scheduling. It is important to notice that the parallelism in the work cited is for the original ratedistortion function proposed by Shannon (5), expressed in terms of two variables, namely, X andX in our notation. In our work, however, we extend Shannon's function to three variables (3), namely W , X, andX. This does not only require a substantially more complex theoretical and computational analysis, as we shall see in Sections 5 and 6, but also formulates a substantially more general problem. On a secondary note, our application, randomized database anonymization, is completely different from network traffic anonymization: just note that our application has one more variable W , in general, different from X.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section investigates the privacy-distortion function (3) introduced in Section 4, by means of extending some of the fundamental properties of its information-theoretic analogous, namely the rate-distortion function. Particularly, we confirm that the privacy-distortion function is convex, extend Shannon's lower bound, and analyze the quadraticGaussian case in detail.
Convexity of the Privacy-Distortion Function
The following theorem states that, similarly to the ratedistortion function, the privacy-distortion function is nonincreasing, convex, and therefore, continuous in the interior of its domain. Theorem 1. The privacy-distortion function (3) is nonincreasing and convex.
The proof of the theorem is provided in Appendix A.2. Furthermore, the optimization problem determining (3), with pX jX as unknown variable, is itself convex. This means that any local minimum is also global, and makes the powerful tools of convex optimization [30] applicable to compute numerically but efficiently the privacy-distortion function. In Section 6, an example of numerical computation will be discussed.
Quadratic-Gaussian Lower Bound
While a general closed-form expression for privacy-distortion function has not been provided, the Shannon lower bound for the rate-distortion function can be extended to find closed-form lower bounds under certain assumptions. Furthermore, the techniques used to prove this bound may yield an exact closed formula in specific cases. A closedform upper bound is presented later in this section.
Recall the notational conventions introduced in Section 3. Throughout this section, W and X are r.v.s taking values in IR m and IR n , respectively, and MSE is used as distortion 
The theorem asserts that the QGLB is indeed a lower bound on the privacy-distortion function (3), for any joint distribution of W and X in euclidean spaces of arbitrary dimension, Gaussian or not. The name is given in recognition of the fact that the bound holds with equality in the Gaussian case, and of the role that properties of Gaussian r.v.s play in the general proof.
Theorem 2. Provided that W and X are r.v.s in euclidean spaces of arbitrary dimension, and that MSE is used as distortion measure, RðDÞ ! R QGLB ðDÞ for all D. In the special case when W and X are jointly Gaussian, the bound holds with equality, and the optimal solution AE in the bound and the optimal solutionX in the privacy-distortion function are related byX ¼ ðI À AÞ X þ A Z, where A ¼ AE AE
À1
X and Z $ N ð X ; ðI À AÞAE X A ÀT Þ is independent of X and W .
The proof of the theorem is presented in Appendix B. Fortunately, the matrix optimization problem in the definition of the QGLB (6) is convex. More precisely, it requires the maximization of a convex function subject to linear matrix inequalities [30] . But the major practical advantage over the general expression of the privacy-distortion function (3) is the number of real-valued variables in the new optimization problem (6), given by the size n Â n of the matrix AE. This number, nðn À 1Þ=2 since AE is symmetric, will be much smaller than the number of variables required in a discretized optimization of the continuous problem posed by (3) (for example, in the simple experiments of Section 6, where n ¼ 1, the discretization used involves a matrix representing pX jX with 31 2 entries.) Methods to solve these problems numerically are outlined in Appendix C for the QGLB, and in Section 6 for the general privacydistortion function. Furthermore, Appendix C provides a closed-form, parametric upper bound on the maximum of the optimization problem inherent in the QGLB, and consequently a looser lower bound on the privacy-distortion function. Aside from not requiring numerical optimization, this second bound comes with the convenient property of matching the QGLB for small distortion values.
In the special case when W and X are random scalars (m ¼ n ¼ 1), direct application of Theorem 2 yields a closed-form expression for the QGLB, and a closed-form solution in the Gaussian case. Define the normalized distortion d ¼ 
Provided that W and X are jointly Gaussian random scalars, and that MSE is used as distortion measure, the QGLB (6) is tight:
1 as before. The optimal randomized perturbation rule achieving this privacy-distortion performance is represented in Fig. 5 . Observe that the perturbed dataX is a convex combination of the source data X and independent noise, in a way such that the final variance achieves the distortion constraint with equality.
Mutual-Information Upper Bound
With the same assumptions of multidimensional, euclidean r.v.s, and MSE distortion measure, extend the definition of the normalized distortion to d ¼ D=trAE X , and consider the two trivial cases d ¼ 0 and d ¼ 1. The former case can be achieved withX ¼ X, yielding RðDÞ ¼ IðW ; XÞ, and the latter witĥ X ¼ X , the mean of X, for which RðDÞ ¼ 0. Now, for any 0 d 1, setX ¼ X with probability 1 À d, andX ¼ X with probability d. Convexity properties of the mutual information guarantee that the privacy-distortion performance of this setting cannot lie above the segment connecting the two trivial cases. Since the setting is not necessarily optimal,
We shall call this bounding function the mutual-information upper bound (MIUB). The pX jX determined by the combination of the two trivial cases for intermediate values of d may be a simple yet effective way to initialize numerical search methods to compute the privacy-distortion function, as it will be shown in Section 6.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Computation of the Privacy-Distortion Function
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical analysis of Section 5 with experimental results for a simple, intuitive case. Specifically, W and X are jointly Gaussian random scalars with correlation coefficient (after zero-mean, unitvariance normalization). In terms of the database anonymization problem, W represents sensitive information, and X corresponds to key attributes that can be used to identify specific individuals. These variables could model, for example, the plasma concentration of LDL cholesterol in adults, which is approximately normal, and their weight, respectively. MSE is used as a distortion measure. For convenience,
Since the privacy-distortion function is convex, minimization of one objective with a constraint on the other is equivalent to the minimization of the Lagrangian cost C ¼ D þ R, for some positive multiplier . We wish to design randomized perturbation rules pX jX minimizing C for several values of , to investigate the feasibility of numerical computation of the privacy-distortion curve, and to verify the theoretical results for the quadratic-Gaussian case of Section 5. As argued in Section 4.4, the perturbation pX jX is basically the PRAM masking method in the discrete case, and a form of noise-addition in the continuous case; we take here microaggregation as a noise addition method.
We implement a slight modification of a simple optimization technique, namely the steepest descent algorithm, operating on a sufficiently fine discretization of the variables involved. More precisely, p WX is the joint PMF obtained by discretizing the PDF of W and X, where each variable is quantized with 31 samples in the interval ½À3; 3. The starting values for pX jX are convex combinations of the extreme cases corresponding to d ¼ 0 and d ¼ 1, as described in Section 5, when the MIUB (9) was discussed. Only results corresponding to the correlation coefficient ¼ 0:95 are shown, for two reasons. First, because of their similarity with results for other values of . Second, because for high correlation, the gap between the MIUB (which approximates the performance of the starting solutions) and the QGLB (6) is wider, leading to a more challenging problem.
The definitions of distortion and privacy risk in Section 4 for the finite-alphabet case become
pðwÞpðxjwÞ ln pðxjwÞ pðxÞ :
The conditional independence assumption in the same section enables us to express the PMFs ofX in the expression for R as pðxÞ ¼ P x pðxjxÞpðxÞ and pðxjwÞ ¼ P x pðxjxÞpðxjwÞ, in terms of the optimization variables pðxjxÞ. Our implementation of the steepest descent algorithm uses the exact gradient with components Two modifications of the standard version of the steepest descent algorithm [30] were applied. First, rather than updating pX jX directly, according to the negative gradient multiplied by a small factor, we used its projection onto the affine set of conditional probabilities satisfying Px pðxjxÞ ¼ 1 for all x, which in fact gives the steepest descent within that set. Second, rather than using a barrier or a Lagrangian function to consider the constraint pðxjxÞ ! 0 for all x andx, after each iteration, we reset possible negative values to zero and renormalized the probabilities accordingly. This may seem unnecessary since the theoretical analysis in Section 5 gives a strictly feasible solution (i.e., probabilities are strictly positive), and consequently the constraints are inactive. However, the algorithm operates on a discretization of the joint distribution of W and X in a machine with finite precision. The fact is that precision errors in the computation of gradient components corresponding to very low probabilities activated the nonnegativity constraints. Finally, we observed that the ratio between the largest and the smallest eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix was large enough for the algorithm to require a fairly small update factor, 10 À4 , to prevent significant oscillations. The privacy-distortion performance of the randomized perturbation rules pX jX found by our modification of the steepest descent algorithm is shown in Fig. 6 , along with the bounds established in Section 5, namely the QGLB (6) and the MIUB (9). On account of (8) We would like to remark that a completely meaningful interpretation of the values of D and R would necessarily lie within the specific application or data set our formulation is used for. The purpose of this brief experimental section is to illustrate our complex theoretical analysis with quite simple statistics, informally motivated at the beginning of this section by the correlation between cholesterol and weight, but ultimately synthetic. Keep in mind that our framework is not aimed at recommending a particular point in the privacy-distortion plane, but at characterizing a trade-off by means of a curve. Having said that, we attempt to partially interpret the results of Fig. 6 , not without a certain degree of abstraction. For instance, the figure shows that for a distortion D ¼ E ðX ÀXÞ 2 ¼ d ¼ 0:5 the corresponding privacy risk is roughly R ¼ IðW ;XÞ ' 0:3. This means that the randomized perturbationX distorts the original data X, leading to an MSE of half of the variance 2 X ¼ 1 of the unperturbed data. This enormous perturbation, in turn, reduces the privacy risk, that is, the mutual information, from roughly IðW ; XÞ ' 1:2 to IðW ;XÞ ' 0:3.
Recall that mutual information is the amount of information that one variable contains about the other (see Sections 3 and 4.2, and the connection with Shannon's equivocation in Section 4.3). Our theory implies that such ambitious reduction in mutual information is not possible without incurring at least this much data distortion. In addition, the same figure unsurprisingly confirms that perfect privacy R ¼ 0, that is, statistical independence between W and X, is unattainable without an absolutely detrimental impact on
A total of 32,000 iterations were computed for each value of , at roughly 150 iterations per second on a modern computer. 1 The large number of iterations is consistent with the fact that the Hessian is ill-conditioned and the small updating step size. One would expect that methods based on Newton's technique [30] converge to the optimal solution in less iterations (at the cost of higher computational complexity per iteration), but our goal was to check the performance of one of the simplest optimization algorithms. In all cases, the conditional PMFs found had a performance very close to that described by (8) in Section 5. Their shape, depicted in Fig. 7 , roughly resembled the Gaussian shape predicted by the theoretical analysis as the number of iterations increased. The shape of the solution plotted is due to the fact that, intuitively, the steepest descent method moves from a "peaky" initial guess towards the optimum, without quite reaching it. Specifically, Fig. 7 corresponds to ' 1:22, was obtained after 32,000 iterations, and the number of discretized samples of X and W was increased from 31 to 51. Increasing the number of iterations to 1,28,000 resulted in an experimental solution shaped almost identically to the optimal one, although the one in Fig. 7 , corresponding to one fourth of the number of iterations, already achieves values of C nearly optimal.
Performance of MDAV and -Approx
Finally, we investigate the privacy-distortion performance of two well-known microaggregation algorithms, namely the maximum distance to average vector (MDAV) algorithm [11] , [31] (implemented in the -Argus [32] and SDCmicro [33] freeware packages), and the -Approx algorithm [12] . The experiment used n ¼ 2 15 ¼ 32;768 drawings of W; X, according to the very same Gaussian distribution used in the verification of the QGLB in Fig. 6 . The privacy risk R ¼ IðW ;XÞ was estimated from a fine quantization of interval length 0.15 on W and theX resulting from the application of each of the k-anonymity algorithms mentioned. The distortion D ¼ E ðX ÀXÞ 2 was computed directly from the original samples and the centroids of the aggregation cells.
The results for several values of k=n are shown in Figs. 8 and 9. The most striking finding is the near-optimality of both algorithms, in terms of the performance criteria, proposed in this work. Intuition suggests, however, that part of their success for this particularly simple data is due to the fact that the key attribute X is a random scalar. The performance of both algorithms would probably deviate more from optimality in case of a multidimensional key attribute (or several key attributes). On the other hand, we would like to mention two reasons why the k-anonymity algorithms do not achieve the QGLB even in this simple setting. First, the perturbation rules considered in the optimization problem inherent in the privacy-distortion function are not constrained to be deterministic. Second, the two k-anonymity algorithms investigated operate solely on X, whereas our criterion for privacy risk involves W as well. Fig. 7 . Shape of initial, optimal, and experimental randomized perturbation rules pX jX found by the steepest descent algorithm. Fig. 8 . Privacy-distortion performance of MDAV on scalar data.
1. Implementation used Matlab R2008a on Windows Vista SP1, on an Intel Core2 Quad Q6600 CPU at 2.4 GHz. Fig. 9 . Privacy-distortion performance of -Approx on scalar data.
An information-theoretic formulation of the privacy-distortion trade-off in applications such as microdata anonymization and location privacy in location-based services is provided. Inspired by the t-closeness model and Shannon's concept of equivocation, the privacy risk is measured as the mutual information between perturbed key attributes and confidential attributes, equivalent to the conditional KL divergence between posterior and prior distributions. We consider the problem of maximizing privacy (that is, minimizing the above mutual information) while keeping the perturbation of data within a prespecified bound to ensure that data utility is not too damaged.
We establish a strong connection between this privacyperturbation problem and the rate-distortion problem of information theory and extend of a number of results, including convexity of the privacy-distortion function and the Shannon lower bound.
In principle, it is clear that randomized perturbation rules, being more general, cannot lead to worse performance than deterministic aggregation, such as that used by MDAV and -Approx. A privacy-distortion formula is obtained for the quadratic-Gaussian case, proving that the optimal perturbation is, in general, randomized rather than deterministic, at least in the continuous case. On the other hand, experimental results with discretized statistics show better performance compared to popular deterministic aggregation algorithms. This evidence supports the use of PRAM in the case of attributes with finite alphabets and noise addition in the continuous case.
APPENDIX A FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF THE PRIVACY-DISTORTION FUNCTION A.1 Optimal Reconstruction
The following proposition is a fundamental result on the reconstruction functionxðqÞ in the quantizer formulation of the privacy-distortion function.
Proposition 3. Definitions (3) and (4) of the privacy-distortion function are equivalent. Furthermore, without loss of generality, one may assume that Q andX are related bijectively, or even that they are equal, in the sense that the assumption does not compromise the optimization problem in the second definition. Finally, in the special case when MSE is used as distortion measure, it may be assumed without loss of generality thatX ¼ Q ¼ E ½XjQ, i.e.,X ¼ Q, where Q is the best (nonlinear) MSE estimate of X from Q.
Proof. For simplicity, we only consider the case when the infimum is, in fact, a minimum, and when E dðX;XÞ can also be minimized. The general proof is similar. Let Q, X ¼xðQÞ correspond to an optimal solution to the optimization problem in (4) . Suppose that Q andX are both replaced by a common function of Q minimizing E dðX;XÞ. In the special case when MSE is used as distortion measure, such function is simply the best MSE estimate E ½XjQ of X from Q. Clearly, this new function of Q will satisfy the distortion constraint. In addition, the data processing inequality [17] guarantees that the mutual information IðW ; QÞ cannot increase. This means that the new choice for Q andX must also correspond to an optimal solution. t u
A.2 Convexity
We prove that the privacy-distortion function (3) is nonincreasing and convex, as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof. The monotonicity of RðDÞ follows immediately from the fact that increasing values of D relax the minimization constraint in its definition.
To prove convexity, for simplicity, we assume that the infimum is achieved, thereby being a minimum. The general proof is similar. 
Similarly, by construction W $ X $X , hence, p ðxjwÞ ¼ P x p ðxjxÞpðxjwÞ also depends linearly on the randomized rule, thus
Recall that mutual information is a convex function of the conditional distribution [17] . Consequently,
Finally, on account of the definition of RðDÞ,
u t
APPENDIX B QUADRATIC-GAUSSIAN LOWER BOUND
We prove that the QGLB (6) is, in fact, a lower bound of the privacy-distortion function (3), as stated in Theorem 2 in Section 5.2, and that it holds with equality in the Gaussian case.
Proof. Here, we essentially exploit statistical and information-theoretic properties of Gaussian distributions in order to transform a convex optimization problem in a conditional distribution into a convex optimization problem in a covariance matrix. Letŵ Q ðQÞ be the best linear MSE estimate of W from Q, and denote the covariance of the estimation error W À w Q ðQÞ by
According to the definition of the privacy-distortion function (4), we wish to minimize I ðW ; QÞ ¼ hðW Þ À hðW jQÞ; subject to a number of constraints. Equivalently, we wish to maximize where a. holds with equality if and only if W Àŵ Q ðQÞ and Q are statistically independent, and b. follows from the fact that Gaussian r.v.s maximize the differential entropy among all r.v.s with a fixed covariance matrix (AE W jQ , in this case). Proposition 3 enables us to assume without loss of generality thatX ¼ Q ¼ E ½XjQ. But if Q is the best MSE estimate of X from Q, then the best linear MSE estimatê x Q ðQÞ of X from Q is Q itself as well. Note, however, that the reverse implication is not necessarily true. In other words, the linear constraintx Q ðQÞ ¼ Q is never more restrictive than the nonlinear one Q ¼ E ½XjQ.
To sum up,
with equality if and only if W Àŵ Q ðQÞ and Q are statistically independent, W Àŵ Q ðQÞ is Gaussian, and x Q ðQÞ ¼ E ½XjQ. Keep in mind that all three conditions for equality are satisfied, in particular, if W , X, and Q are jointly Gaussian. We now focus our attention on the optimization problem in the right-hand side of (10) and realize that the problem is completely determined by the first and second-order statistics of the r.v.s involved. Consequently, without loss of generality, but for the exclusive purpose of solving this maximization problem, we may regard W , X, and Q as jointly Gaussian, and concern ourselves solely with means and covariances. To complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to show that the maximum of this optimization problem is the same as that of the problem
À Á subject to 0 " AE " AE X ; and tr AE D;
in the variable AE 2 IR nÂn , under the assumptions that all variables involved are jointly Gaussian and, of course, that W $ X $ Q.
First, we verify that the constraints are equivalent, and that the variable AE is in fact AE XÀQ . From the application of the orthogonality principle of linear estimation to the constraint Q ¼x Q ðQÞ, it follows that AE X ¼ AE Q þ AE XÀQ (i.e., the observation Q and the error X À Q are uncorrelated). Consequently, 0 " AE XÀQ " AE X . Conversely, since Q ¼ X , any AE XÀQ satisfying these matrix inequalities completely determines a AE Q # 0, and therefore, all the statistics needed to specify Q, assumed Gaussian. On the other hand, the distortion constraint may be equivalently written as trAE XÀQ D.
Second, we check that the optimization objective is the same by expressing AE W jQ , in terms of second-order statistics of W and X. The constraint Q ¼x Q ðQÞ implies that Q ¼ X , due to the fact that optimum linear MSE estimators are unbiased, and that AE QX ¼ AE Q , because of the orthogonality principle. Since by assumption Q and X are jointly Gaussian and W $ X $ Q, one may write Q as the sum of two terms. Namely, the sum of AE QX AE À1 X ðX À X Þ þ Q , its best linear MSE estimate from X, and the error N ð0; AE QjX Þ, which must be independent of both W and X. More precisely, defining
In addition, the covariance between W and Q is the same as the covariance between W and the estimate
X AE XW , and finally,
APPENDIX C COMPUTATION OF THE QGLB
In this section, we investigate the convex optimization problem included in the QGLB (6) . Specifically, let X; Y 2 IR nÂn , A 2 IR mÂn , B 2 IR mÂm , and t ! 0. We consider the following optimization problem in the matrix variable X:
This is, in general, a loose bound on the privacy-distortion function, in the sense that equality might not hold even in the Gaussian case, but it matches the QGLB for small distortion. We may solve problem (11) numerically by applying an interior-point method with log-det barrier functions [30] for the constraints 0 " X " Y . A lower bound on the QGLB, that is, a second lower bound on the privacy-distortion function, is given in Proposition 5, by means of an upper bound on problem (11) . While the bound is loose in the sense that equality does not necessarily hold even in the Gaussian case, it is expressed in parametric, closed form, not requiring numerical optimization. For sufficiently low distortion, however, Proposition 6 guarantees that both bounds match. A preliminary lemma is required, which solves a convex optimization problem bearing some resemblance to the usual reverse water-filling problem of information theory, arising in the computation of the rate-distortion function for multivariate Gaussian statistics. Just as in that problem, the solution is given in parametric form. The solution to the problem is given by
in the case when P i¼1 y i > t, and x i ¼ y i otherwise. In the first case, the parameter is chosen to satisfy t ¼ P r i¼1 x i . Also in this case, ! 1 implies that x i ¼ 0 for all i, and 1=ð1= r þ maxfy i gÞ implies that x i ¼ y i for all i.
Proof (Sketch). The lemma can be proved by a systematic application of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [30] . A more intuitive proof exploits the fact that maximizing the equivalent objective P i lnð1 þ i x i Þ subject to P i x i t and the rest of constraints is in fact a resource allocation problem. For instance, for all i such that 0 < x i < y i , the Pareto equilibrium condition means that the marginal ratios of improvement d dx i lnð1 þ i x i Þ must all be the same. Otherwise, minor allocation adjustments on the resources x i could improve the objective. t u
The next proposition gives an upper bound on the maximum of problem (11).
Proposition 5. Let X; Y 2 IR nÂn , A 2 IR mÂn , B 2 IR mÂm , and t ! 0. Consider the following optimization problem in the matrix variable X:
Assume that B is invertible, and write the spectral decomposition of the nonnegative definite matrix
. . . ; r ; 0; . . . ; 0Þ and 1 ! Á Á Á ! r > 0 (r is in fact the rank of A). Suppose further that Y 0 ¼ V T Y V is diagonal. Then, the maximum in the optimization problem is
in the case when P i¼1 y 0 ii > t, and i ¼ y 0 ii otherwise. In the first case, the parameter is chosen to satisfy t ¼ P r i¼1 i . 
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